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Abstract—The smart grid (SG), generally referred to as the
next-generation power system, is considered as a revolutionary
and evolutionary regime of existing power grids. Among the
emerging SG applications, the advanced metering infrastructure
(AMI) enables automated, two-way communication between a
smart meter (SM) and a public utility company. To authenticate
a message, the sender (e.g., a SM) signs the message with its
private key using a pre-defined digital signature algorithm. To
verify the message, the recipient verifies the sender’s certificate
and then the sender’s signature using the sender’s public key.
In some cases, however, a previously issued certificate for a
network node needs to be revoked. In this paper we investigate
two possible approaches for the certificate management of SMs
in AMI networks. These are based on the traditional certificate
revocation lists (CRLs) and on the Bloom filters. We compare
the two approaches in terms of the required packet size for the
distribution of the revoked certificate serial numbers. We also
discuss the advantages and limitations of each approach.
Keywords—Certificate revocation list; advanced metering infras-
tructure; smart grid; Bloom filter.
I. INTRODUCTION
The smart grid (SG) [1], generally referred to as the next-
generation power system, is considered as a revolutionary and
evolutionary regime of existing power grids. More importantly,
with the integration of advanced computing and communi-
cation technologies, the SG is expected to greatly enhance
the efficiency and reliability of future power systems with
renewable energy resources, as well as distributed intelligence
and demand response [2].
The SG requires efficient and reliable communication
networks for management and coordination [3]. Among the
emerging SG applications, the advanced metering infras-
tructure (AMI) enables automated, two-way communication
between a smart (utility) meter (SM) and a public utility
company. For example, a SM may collect power consumption
information from various smart home appliances, such as
washing machines and refrigerators, and send the aggregated
measurement data to the electric utility company. A SM
typically has an IP address and may report the aggregated
measurement data to the utility company. A SM may also
send control commands to smart appliances to turn them on
and off based on various cost optimization objectives [4]. In
general, the goal of an AMI is to provide the utility companies
with real-time data about power consumption and allow the
customers to make informed choices about energy usage based
on the price at the time of use. A typical AMI network
consists of a number of SMs that are connected to a gateway,
which forwards the data and control messages to/from the
utility company. Our considered AMI network architecture is
described in more detail in Section III.
Along with the salient features of the SG and the AMI,
cyber security emerges to be a critical issue because large
numbers of heterogeneous electronic devices are intercon-
nected via communication networks throughout critical power
facilities. This has an immediate impact on reliability of
such a widespread infrastructure [5]–[8]. Some of the basic
SG operations include establishing remote connections with
sensor nodes and performing updates and configurations. These
operations require the development of appropriate methods for
enabling secure connection, secure boot, and secure update
of SG sensor nodes. Due to the resource-constrained nature
of typical SG nodes, the suitability of traditional Internet
protocols, such as IPsec and TLS, needs to be re-examined.
Focusing on the AMI network, the main security require-
ments include identity and message authentication, message
integrity, non-repudiation, accountability, and access control
[11]. These requirements are typically achieved by using the
public-key cryptosystems in which each SM has one private
and one public key. The private keys are kept secret, whereas
the public keys are announced in the network. The binding
of a public key with a particular SM identity is usually
performed via a public key certificate that is issued by a
(trusted) certificate authority (CA). To authenticate a message,
the sender SM signs the message with its private key using a
pre-defined digital signature algorithm. To verify the message,
the recipient (SM, gateway, or utility company) verifies the
sender’s certificate and then the sender’s signature using the
sender’s public key. In some cases, however, a previously
issued certificate for a network node needs to be revoked.
In this work, we investigate two possible approaches for
digital certificate revocation in AMI networks, namely the
certificate revocation lists (CRLs) and Bloom filters (BFs). In
particular, by considering realistic scenarios we compare the
two approaches in terms of the required packet size and discuss
their limitations.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In Section II
we discuss different approaches for digital certificate manage-
ment. In Section III we describe our considered AMI network
architecture. In Section IV we describe and analyze a BF-based
approach for the management of digital certificates in AMI
networks. In Section V we discuss the main limitation of the
BF-based approach, namely the false positives. In Section VI
we compare the traditional CRL-based approach with the BF-
based approach in terms of the required packet size. Finally, in
Section VII we conclude and discuss possible future directions.
Also, in Table I we present the list of abbreviations used in
this paper.
II. DIGITAL CERTIFICATE MANAGEMENT APPROACHES
A. Certificate Revocation Lists (CRLs)
As discussed in Section I, in some cases a previously
issued certificate for a network node needs to be revoked.
This may happen if, for example, the particular node has been
captured by an adversary or the node’s private key has been
compromised. Hence, if some nodes show malicious behavior,
their certificates must be quickly revoked in order to protect
the rest of the network. Certificate revocation is typically done
by the CA who regularly announces the CRLs. Hence, each
network node before accepting a signed message must check
with the CRL to ensure that the sender’s certificate has not
been revoked. In the case of the AMI network, the traditional
approach that requires the CRLs to be stored in each SM and
be frequently updated by the CA, introduces significant storage
and communication overhead [9]
B. The Online Certificate Status Protocol (OCSP)
An alternative approach to CRLs is to use the online
certificate status protocol (OCSP) [10]. Similar to the CRLs,
the OCSP enables a requesting party (e.g., a SM) to determine
the revocation state of a certificate. However, this information
is stored in a remote server rather than in the SM itself. When a
CA signs a certificate, it will typically include an OCSP server
address in the certificate. Hence, when a node (e.g., a SM) is
presented with another node’s certificate, it will send a query to
the OCSP server. The latter listens to queries and responds with
the revocation status of the certificate. The main advantage
of the OCSP over the CRL approach is that since an OCSP
response contains less information than a typical CRL, it puts
less burden on network and client resources. On the other hand,
a big disadvantage of the OCSP approach is that the certificate
verification cannot be done locally and there is a need to deploy
new devices to act as OCSP servers. Furthermore, it is insecure
to install the OCSP servers on gateways that are typically
deployed in streets and lack physical security. Finally, it is not
efficient and scalable to use the CA as the OCSP server due to
significant communication delays and overhead for performing
the queries from remote SMs [11].
C. Bloom filter (BF)-Based Certificate Management
Due to aforementioned limitations of the traditional CRLs
and the OCSP, attempts have been made to mitigate their
performance and scalability limitations using BFs [9], [11],
[12]. A BF is a space-efficient probabilistic data structure that
is used to concisely represent a set and allows highly efficient
set membership queries [13]. For this reason, the BF-based
approach appears as an attractive solution for enabling an
efficient management of digital certificates in AMI networks.
In particular, the set of revoked certificates is encoded by the
CA into a BF and is sent to all SMs. Each SM stores the
BF locally. When the certificate verification is required, the
TABLE I. LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS
AMI Advanced Metering Infrastructure
BF Bloom Filter
CA Certificate Authority
CRL Certificate Revocation List
CSN Certificate Serial Number
GW Gateway
HAN Home Area Network
OCSP Online Certificate Status Protocol
NAN Neighborhood Area Network
SHA Smart Home Appliance
SG Smart Grid
SM Smart Meter
WAN Wide Area Network
SM performs a membership test to determine whether a given
certificate is in the BF or not. Compared to the traditional CRL-
based approach, the BF-based approach requires less storage
space. Compared to the OCSP-based approach, the BF-based
approach does not require sending queries to a remote server
and, hence, is faster and more bandwidth-efficient. However,
the BF-based approach has some probability of giving false
positives in a membership test. That is, an element (i.e., a
certificate in our case) may appear to belong to the set (i.e.,
the set of revoked certificates in our case) when in fact it does
not. This is a direct consequence of the compressed nature of
BFs.
False positives during the certificate verification could be
very problematic, because they may cause a node to discard
a legitimate message by wrongly assuming that the sender’s
certificate has been revoked. Fortunately, as it is shown in
Section VI, the false positives probability can be kept low
by increasing the size of the BF. Furthermore, various BF
optimizations can be preformed to further decrease the false
positives rate [14]. On the other hand, a big advantage is that
the BF-based approach has no false negatives. That is, if a
certificate is not found in the BF, this means that it has not
been revoked and the receiving node can trust the message
signature.
III. ADVANCED METERING INFRASTRUCTURE (AMI)
NETWORK ARCHITECTURE
In this Section we present our considered AMI network
architecture. The architecture is shown in Fig. 1 and comprises
three tiers:
• Home area network (HAN): It consists of one SM and
several smart home appliances (SHAs), such as TV, re-
frigerator, security cameras, etc. The network topology
is typically a star with the SM as the central node. The
communication of the SM and SHAs is done using
some appropriate two-way short-range communication
technology, such as ZigBee/IEEE 802.15.4.
• Neighborhood area network (NAN): It consists of one
gateway (GW) and several SMs. These typically form
a wireless mesh network and use some appropriate
medium-range communication technology, such as
WiFi/IEEE 802.11.
• Wide area network (WAN): Is used to connect the
GW to the electric utility and the CA. This typically
requires a long-range wired or wireless communica-
tions technology, such as cellular LTE-based network.
Fig. 1. Advanced metering infrastructure (AMI) network architecture.
IV. BLOOM FILTER BASED DIGITAL CERTIFICATE
MANAGEMENT
Consider a CA that needs to disseminate the CRL to the
SMs in a NAN. The number of certificates in the CRL is
denoted by N . A certificate is included in the CRL by adding
the certificate’s serial number (CSN) which is unique for a
given CA. The CRL also includes the CA’s signature. Hence,
the traditional CRL has a length of:
LCRL = LCSNN + LCAS (1)
where LCSN is the length of a CSN and LCAS is the length
of CA’s signature. A typical CSN has a length of 16-20 bytes,
depending on the CA, and the CA’s signature is about 700
bytes [12].
An alternative approach is to encode the revoked CSNs into
a BF. The basic concept of the BF-based approach is illustrated
in Fig. 2. A BF is a bit-vector that is used to store elements
of a set (e.g., the revoked CSNs in our case). The length of
the BF is denoted by m. It is possible to add elements into
the BF, but it is not possible to remove elements.
A. Adding Elements into a BF
Assume that initially the BF is empty. This is denoted by
setting all bits to 0. To add an element into the BF, the element
is hashed by K hash functions, h1(), h2(), . . . , hK(). Each
hash function returns an integer in the range [1, . . . ,m]. This
integer represents the position of the m-bit vector that will be
set to 1. The result of these K hashing operations is that some
bits in the BF are set to 1. In Fig. 2 we show an example
of adding two CSNs into an m-bit BF using K = 3 hash
functions. For instance, we have h1(CSN1) = 2. This means
that after applying the 1st hash function to the 1st element,
Fig. 2. The Bloom filter concept: adding two elements.K = 3 hash functions.
the position 2 in the BF will be set to 1. Similarly, we have
h3(CSN2) = 6. This means that after applying the 3rd hash
function to the 2nd element, the position 6 in the BF will be
set to 1.
B. Testing Element Membership in a BF
Consider now a non-empty BF that contains (all) the ele-
ments of a set. To test whether an element is a member of the
set or not, the element is hashed using the K aforementioned
hash functions. Then the resultant K bit positions are checked
against the corresponding bit positions in the BF. If all these
bit positions in the BF are 1, then the test result is positive.
That is, the element is considered to be a member of the set
(although false positives may occur, as will be discussed in
Section V, below). If at least one of the K positions in the BF
is not 1, then the test result is negative. That is, the element
is not a member of the set (recall that there are no false
negatives in BF membership tests). As an illustration of the
membership test, consider the BF of Fig. 2. To perform the
test on CSN1, we determine the K = 3 hash values, which
give us: h1(CSN1) = 2, h2(CSN1) = 4, and h3(CSN1) = 7.
After that, we verify that all three given positions, 2, 4, and
7, in the BF are set to 1. Hence, the set membership of the
element CSN1 has been verified.
V. FALSE POSITIVES IN BLOOM FILTERS
A. An Example
As mentioned in Subsection IV-A an element is added
into the BF by setting appropriate bit positions to 1. These
bit positions are returned by K hash functions. However, it
may happen that by adding some elements to the BF, all K
bit positions that correspond to another element (that was not
intended to be added) are set to 1. One such case is shown
in Fig. 3. In this example, the BF that was created by the
adding elements CSN1 and CSN2 of the example of Section
IV. Assume that we would like to perform the membership
test for another element, CSN3. As illustrated in Subsection
IV-B, the test is performed by hashing the element with K
hash functions. If the resultant hash values are h1(CSN3) = 6
Fig. 3. Illustrating the false positives during a membership test.
h2(CSN3) = 4, and h3(CSN3) = 7, then the test will give a
positive result since all three resultant bits positions (6,4, and
7) are set to 1 in the BF. However, since CSN3 is actually
not a member of the set, we refer to this test result as a false
positive.
B. Calculating the False Positive Probability
The false positive probability of a BF can be determined
as follows. Consider an m-bit vector b = (b1, b2, . . . , bm)
representing a BF. The BF is initially empty, that is bi =
0, ∀i ∈ [1, . . . ,m]. Assume that we add N CSNs, denoted
as CSNj , j ∈ [1, . . . , N ], into the BF using K independent
hash functions, denoted as hk(), k ∈ [1, . . . ,K]. Let us denote
by nk,j the hash value that results after hashing CSNj with
the k-th hash function, hk(). For instance, in Fig. 2 we have
n1,1 = h1(CSN1) = 2 and n2,3 = h2(CSN3) = 6.
When applying the 1st hash function to the 1st CSN, the
hash value n1,1 denotes the bit position in the vector b that
will be set to 1. Since b has m bits, the probability that
any particular bit bi is set to 1 is 1/m. Consequently, the
probability that any particular bit bi remains 0 is 1 − 1/m.
When applying K hash functions to the 1st CSN, due to the
independence of hash functions, the probability that a bit bi
remains 0 is (1−1/m)K . Similarly, when N CSNs are hashed
with K hash functions, the probability that a bit bi is 0 is
Pr(bi = 0) = (1 − 1/m)
KN . Consequently, the probability
that a bit bi is set to 1 is:
Pr(bi = 1) = 1− (1−
1
m
)KN (2)
When performing a membership test for a particular
CSN CSNj , order to have a false positive, all hash values
n1,j , n2,j , . . . , nK,j must point to the bit positions that are set
to 1 in the vector b. This happens with probability:
PFP (CSNj) =
K∏
k=1
Pr(bnk,j = 1) = (1−(1−
1
m
)KN )K (3)
By introducing the approximation (1 − 1/m)KN ≈
e−KN/m, which holds as m→∞, (3) can be re-written as:
PFP = (1− (1−
1
m
)KN )K = (1− e−KN/m)K (4)
It can be shown that PFP is minimized when the (optimal)
number of hash functions is [14]:
Kopt =
m
N
ln 2 (5)
Hence, substituting (5) into (3) we get:
PFP = (1− e
− ln 2)(ln 2)m/N = 0.5(ln 2)m/N (6)
The above can be rewritten as:
lnPFP = −
m
N
(ln 2)2 (7)
Finally, the above can be rewritten as follows to express the
required BF size, m, in terms of the false positive probability,
PFP , and the number of elements, N , in the set:
m = −
N lnPFP
(ln 2)2
(8)
VI. EVALUATION
In this Section we compare the BF-based certificate man-
agement with the traditional CRL-based approach. The com-
parison is made in terms of the required packet size. We
assume that both the BF and the CRL are created by the CA
and are sent to the SMs at regular intervals (e.g., daily).
In Fig. 4 we present the required packet size versus differ-
ent numbers of revoked certificates, N , for both approaches. In
the case of the CRL-based approach, we consider two different
sizes for the CSNs: LCSN = 15 bytes and LCSN = 20 bytes.
The packet size corresponds to the CRL length of (1) and the
CA’s signature length is chosen to be LCAS = 700 bytes.
In the case of the BF-based approach, the CSN size does
not affect the packet size. This is because each CSN is hashed
intoK bit positions (as mentioned in Section IV). Furthermore,
since the BF-based approach introduces false positives during
the membership test, we distinguish three different cases for
the false positive probability: 1%, 0.5%, and 0.1%. The packet
size corresponds to the BF size of (8) but is converted from bits
to bytes in order to enable the comparison with the CRL-based
approach.
The results of Fig. 4 show that in all cases the BF-
based approach requires a significantly smaller packet size
compared to the CRL-based approach. This results in the
advantages in reducing both the storage overhead at the SMs
as well the communication overhead between the CA and
the SMs. Although the BF-based approach suffers from the
false positives, we observe that the packet size reduction is
significant even in the case that we require a very low false
positive rate of 0.1%.
Fig. 4. Packet size versus the number of revoked certificates for CRL-based
and BF-based approaches.
VII. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper we consider an AMI network architecture
and investigate possible approaches for the digital certificate
management. In particular, we explore two solutions for com-
municating the revoked certificate serial numbers to the smart
meters, namely the traditional CRL-based approach and the
BF-based approach. Analytical calculations based on realistic
parameters show that the BF-based approach requires much
lower packet size compared to the CRL-based approach for
the same number of revoked certificates. On the other hand,
the BF-based approach suffers from the false positives. That is,
there is some probability that a genuine certificate may appear
as revoked during the certificate verification process. However,
as shown, the false positive rate can be reduced to some ac-
ceptable level by increasing the packet size. In our considered
scenario, even when the upper limit for false positive is as low
as 0.1%, the BF-based approach still results in much smaller
packet size compared to the CRL-based approach. In our future
work we plan to further investigate the applicability of BFs
for certificate management in AMI networks and to perform
comparisons with the online protocols, such as the OCSP.
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